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THE 'S' OF 'SECURITY': EUROPE ON THE ROAD TO GMES

T H E 'S' OF ' S E C U R I T ~ "EUROPE
:
ON T H E
ROAD TO GMES
Dr. Frans G. von der Dunk*
1. Towards Global Monitoring for the Environment
and Security (GMES)
In November 2001, by means of a Resolution1 the European
Union officially launched 'Global Monitoring for the Environment
and Security'(GMES), the second European space programme
(after Galileo2) essentially driven by the Union. The Resolution
inter alia calls for the European Commission to coordinate with

*

Director Space Law Research, International Institute of Air and Space
Law, Leiden University. This Article forms part of the Leiden Faculty of
Law research programme "Securing the rule of law in a world of multilevel
jurisdiction: coherence, institutional principles and fundamental rights".
1. Council Resolution on the launch of the initial period of global monitoring
for environment and security (GMES), of 13 November 2001; OJ C 35014
(2001). See further Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament and the Council - Global Monitoring for Environment and
Security (GMES): Establishing a GMES capacity by 2008, COM(2004) 65
final, of 3 February 2004.
2. See for Galileo: Council Resolution on the European Contribution to the
Development of a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), of 19
December 1994; OJ C 37912 (1994); Council Resolution on the involvement
of Europe in a new generation of satellite navigation services - GalileoDefinition phase, of 19 July 1999; OJ C 221101 (1 999); Council Regulation
setting up the Galileo Joint Undertaking, No. 876/2002/EC, of 21 May
2002; OJ L 13811 (2002); Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council - Integration of the EGNOS programme
in the Galileo programme, COM(2003) 123 final, of 19 March 2003; and
Council Regulation on the establishment of structures for the management
of the European satellite radio-navigation programmes, No. 132112004/EC,
of 12 July 2004; OJ L 24611 (2004).
Published in Soochow Law Journal v. 4, no. 2 (2007), pp. 1-27.
Copyright © 2007 Frans von der Dunk.
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the European Space Agency (ESA) the realisation of "an
operational and autonomous European capability for global
monitoring for environment and security" by 2008, crucially
involving a satellite s y ~ t e r n . ~
Relevant data which are to form part of such a capability
may, in principle, come from a number of different sources:
space-based data, airborne data, and in situ-generated data of
different terrestrial origin. However, non-space data almost by
definition are generated within one national state or other, which
means that applicable law and regulation in principle differs and sometimes hugely so - from state to state, whilst generally
not having developed with any specific consideration for the
types of data involved in GMES either.
By contrast, outer space is an international area outside of
any state's international individual jurisdiction4, where operational
paradigms of a principally international, even global character
apply. This also has a profound impact on the legal issues
closely connected to the generation of space-based data, as
opposed to data generated in other modes where national sovereignty
remains fully visible. Moreover, the space-part is clearly the most
distinguishing factor of any GMES operation, in view also of
the envisaged fundamental role of satellites, ESA5 and likely

3. Para. (3), Council Resolution of 13 November 2001.
4. See esp. Art. 11, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (hereafter Outer Space Treaty), London/Moscow/Washington,
done 27 January 1967, entered into force 10 October 1967; 610 UNTS
205; TIAS 6347; 18 UST 2410; UKTS 1968 No. 10; Cmnd. 3198; ATS
1967 No. 24; 6 ILM 386 (1967).
5. The European Space Agency (ESA) was established by the Convention
for the Establishment of a European Space Agency (hereafter ESA
Convention), Paris, done 30 May 1975, entered into force 30 October 1980;
14 ILM 864 (1975).
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EUMETSAT6 in this context.
For the purpose of GMES the establishment of a core entity
provisionally labelled 'GMES Authority' is envisaged. Legal
basis, status, role and competencies of such a body are yet to
be determined. The documents so far referring to such a GMES
Authority generally discuss various types of bodies or organs
that can be established under EC law. Thus, mention has been
made of such options as a Joint Undertaking7, an Executive
Agencyg, a Community Agency9 or a Joint Technology Initiative

6. The European Meteorological Satellite Organisation EUMETSAT was
established by the Convention for the Establishment of a European
Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT),
Geneva, done 24 May 1983, entered into force 19 June 1986; as amended
14 July 1994, entered into force 27 July 1994; Cmnd. 9483; Space Law
- Basic Legal Documents, C.III.l; 44 ZLW 68 (1995).
7. Under Art. 171, Treaty Establishing the European Community (Consolidated
Version) (hereafter EC Treaty); OJ C 325133 (2002). The example usually
referred to, of course, is the Galileo Joint Undertaking currently preparing
the Galileo operational phases. See e.g. Communication of 3 February
2004, p. 17.
8. Cf. Council Regulation laying down the status for executive agencies to
be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community programmes,
No. 58120031EC, of 19 December 2002; OJ L 1111 (2003); as well as, by
way of example, Commission Decision setting up an executive agency, the
'Intelligent Energy Executive Agency', to manage Community action in
the field of energy in application of Council Regulation (EC) No. 5812003,
No. 2004/20/EC, of 23 December 2003; OJ L 5185 (2004); and Commission
Decision setting up an executive agency, the 'Executive Agency for the
Public Health Programme', for the management of Community action in
the field of public health - pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No.
5812003, No. 2004/858/EC, of 15 December 2004; OJ L 369173 (2004).
9. Cf. e.g. the European Environment Agency (EEA), established by Council
Regulation on the establishment of the European Environment Agency and
the European Environment Information and Observation Network, No.
1210/90/EEC, of 7 May 1990; OJ L 12011 (1990); the European Aviation
Safety Agency (EASA), established by Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing
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A final important point, of a more background/political nature
but so far left largely unattended (at least in public discourse)
concerns the involvement of GMES in security issues, in the
field of outer space where traditionally 'defence' and 'security'
have never been very far away. Whilst 'security' is broadly
conceived so as to include civil security, involving not only
terrorist threats but also the threats posed by natural or man-made
disasters, it certainly also includes the more traditional security
issues of a military and defence nature. GMES, whatever the
'GMES Authority' will come to look like, will have the European
Union for a father and ESA for a mother.
Here, it must be noted that ESA, in accordance with its
constitutive Convention, is supposed to "provide for and to
promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, cooperation among
European States in space research and technology and their
space applications, with a view to their being used for scientific
purposes and for operational space applications system^".^^
Traditionally this has been interpreted as a ban on ESA
involvement in any space activities of a military or defence
nature, but it may be noted that already with Galileo that
interpretation is shifting to a broader interpretation allowing
such involvement, at least as long as of a purely defensive
nature (alternatively being sanctioned at the UN-level).12
a European Aviation Safety Agency, No. 1592/2002/EC, of 15 July 2002;
OJ L 24011 (2002); and the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA),
established by Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
establishing a European Maritime Safety Agency, No. 140612002/EC, of
27 June 2002; OJ L 20811 (2002).
10. See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament - European Space Policy - Preliminary Elements, SEC(2005)
664, Brussels, 23 May 2005, COM(2005) 208 final.
11. Art. 11, ESA Convention; emphasis added.
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Similarly, the European Union is formally supposed to limit
its activities to those not involving pure defence and military
issues. The EU-pillar established to deal with common foreign
and security policy is a straightforward intergovernmental
construction, with at best a marginal role for the Commission
as supposed guardian of the overarching European interest and
no role for the elaborate legislative, adjudicative and enforcement
jurisdiction developed in the context of the EC Treaty.13 In
Europe, matters of international cooperation in the areas of
defence and security have so far been essentially dealt with in
the context of NAT014 or at best the Western European Union
(WEU)15 - which, interestingly enough, has been drawn closer
into the EU structures over the past few years. Also for the
Union however, Galileo represents the first case where a more
active and leading role in defence and security matters is
12. One of the key services which Galileo is going to offer concerns the

Public-Regulated Service (PRS), which is going to be encrypted and provided
with a certain measure of technical robustness against interference, and is
intended for usage by government services or specific government-monitored
or government-protected services (such as telecommunication or energy
networks) only. Several EU member states have already indicated that they
envisage usage of the PRS also by their respective militaries, though this
has not been generally accepted yet. See on the set-up of Galileo and its
services e.g. the author's Liability for Global Navigation Satellite Services:
A Comparative Analysis of GPS and Galileo, 30 Journal of Space Law
(2004), 145-52.
13. Cf. e.g. Artt. 2-5, EC Treaty, referring to the tasks and objectives of the
Community, not offering any, even indirect, reference to matters of a
defence or military nature, whilst also indicating that it "shall act within
the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the
objectives assigned to it therein".
14. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was established by the
North Atlantic Treaty, Brussels, done 4 April 1949, entered into force 24
August 1949; 34 UNTS 243; TIAS No. 1964; 63 Stat. 2241.
15. The Western European Union (WEU) was established in its original version
by the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective
Self-Defence, Brussels, done 17 March 1948, entered into force 25 August
1948, and repeatedly amended in the decades since.
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becoming acceptable and accepted - with GMES following
closely upon its heels.
Such growing involvement of both ESA and the Union in
defence and security matters raises a number of questions as
regards the legal issues playing in those areas. How has the
possibility of GMES-generated data being of fundamental military
or security interest been dealt with? How is a proper and
acceptable measure of access to such data taken care of, balancing
security and military interests of GMES-backing states with the
professed contribution of GMES data to enhanced environmental
and civil security calling for wide access possibilities?
The current article raises two sets of issues from this
perspective. On the one hand, there are general security and
dual-use issues, where existing international arrangements may
have a bearing on the legal context within which certain GMES
services might be provided. On the other hand, an international
regime exists which is applicable to access to data resulting
from remote sensing which may have its effects on GMES, and
the possibilities to do what it is being established for, as well.

2. Security and dual-use issues
2.1. The Wassenaar Arrangement
The Wassenaar Arrangement is a formally non-binding
arrangement on export controls for conventional weapons and
sensitive dual-use goods and technologies.16 It was designed to
16. Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (hereafter Wassenaar Arrangement),
Wassenaar, done 19 December 1995, effective 12 July 1996. Currently, the
following states are participating states in the Wassenaar Arrangement,
with the states being members of the Union and/or ESA so indicated: Argentina,
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promote transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of
conventional arms, dual-use goods and dual-use technologies.
Participating states commit themselves to ensure through
national policies and, where appropriate, national regulations that
cross-border transfers of these items do not contribute to the
development or enhancement of military capabilities in states
not participating in the Wassenaar Arrangement.I7
The decision to actually allow or deny transfer of any item,
however, remains the sole responsibility of each individual
participating state.Ig Thus, also, export controls differ from state
to state in terms of documentation required, license fees, length
of time to get a license, and duration of validity of the license.
The participating states only agree to notify transfers and
denials, as well as to control (transfers of) all items in the List
of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and the List of Munitions,
annexed to the Arrangement.19 Controls do not apply to technology
or software in the public domain, to basic scientific research
or to the minimum necessary information for patent applications.
The Lists have two annexes, of sensitive items and of very
sensitive items respectively, to which different levels of control
should be applied, and are reviewed regularly to reflect
Australia, Austria (EU & ESA), Belgium (EU & ESA), Bulgaria (EU),
Canada. Croatia. Czech Republic (EU), Denmark (EU & ESA), Estonia
(EU), Finland (EU & ESA), France (EU & ESA), Germany (EU & ESA),
Greece (EU & ESA), Hungary (EU), Ireland (EU & ESA), Italy (EU &
ESA), Japan, Latvia (EU), Lithuania (EU), Luxembourg (EU & ESA),
Malta (EU). the Netherlands (EU & ESA), New Zealand, Norway (ESA),
Poland (EU), Portugal (EU & ESA), Republic of Korea, Romania (EU),
the Russian Federation, Slovakia (EU), Slovenia (EU), South Africa, Spain
(EU & ESA), Sweden (EU & ESA), Switzerland (ESA), Turkey, Ukraine,
the United Kingdom (EU & ESA), and the United States.
17. See Art. I ( l ) , Wassenaar Arrangement.
18. See Art. 11(3), Wassenaar Arrangement.
19. See Artt. II(4), III(l), Wassenaar Arrangement; also Appendix 5.
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technological developments.
Finally, the participating states agree to exchange general
information on risks associated with transfers of conventional
arms and dual-use goods and technologies in order to consider,
where necessary, the scope for coordinating national control
policies to combat these risks.20
As to GMES, this means inter alia that the products and
services envisaged by GMES might well turn out to be, explicitly
but especially implicitly, included in the relevant List, resulting
in potential obstacles to distribution of relevant GMES-generated
information for the purposes of the environment and security.
Much depends here on whether the recipients of GMES-generated
information would be parties to the Wassenaar Arrangement
themselves, so as to 'bind' them to applicable rules with regard
to transfers outside the group of parties to the Wassenaar Arrangement.

2.2. Regulation 133412000

The Wassenaar Arrangement as such does not recognise the
European Union in any substantive manner even as all of its
members, with the single exception of Cyprus, are participating
states. Partially as a result thereof, within Europe the same
issue was also dealt with in a more classical, legally binding
format by means of Regulation 133412000, which sets up a
regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology,
including cryptographic items, for the Union itself.21 An
20. See Art. IV( I ), Wassenaar Arrangement.
21. Council Regulation setting up a Community regime for the control of
exports of dual-use items and technology (hereafter Regulation 1334/2000).
No. 1334/2000/EC, o f 22 June 2000; OJ L 15911 (2000). The Regulation
has been amended and updated by Council Regulation amending Regulation
(EC) No. 133412000 with regard to intra-Community transfers and exports
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authorisation is required for export of the dual-use items listed
in Annex I (which is essentially similar to the Wassenaar
Arrangement's List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies).
If the prospective exporter is aware that an item might be
used in a way proscribed by the Regulation, it is bound to
apply the applicable provisions, even if it is not listed in Annex
1.22 Under the Regulation, export includes transmission of
software or technology by electronic media, fax or telephone
to a destination outside the Union.
As with the Wassenaar Arrangement, under Regulation
133412000 the responsibility for deciding on applications for
export authorisations lies with the national authorities. Some
items on the List of Dual-Use Items and Technology (Annex
1) are not controlled if they accompany the user and are for
the user's personal use: Regulation 133412000 "does not apply
to the supply of services or the transmission of technology if
that supply or transmission involves cross-border movement of
natural person^".'^
The Regulation establishes a Community General Export
Authorisation (CGEA) for certain exports by means of Annex
of dual-use items and technology, No. 288912000/EC, of 22 December
2000; OJ L 336114 (2000); Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC)
No. 133412000 with regard to the list of controlled dual-use items and
technology when exported. No. 458/2001/EC, of 6 March 2001; OJ L 65/19
(2001); and Council Regulation amending and updating Regulation (EC)
No. 133412000 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports
of dual-use iteins and technology, No. 2432/2001/EC, of 20 November
2001; OJ L 33811 (2001). The last Regulation updates and replaces the
Annexes to Regulation 133412000 in order to take account of, inter alia,
changes adopted by the Wassenaar Arrangement plenary session in December
2000.
22. See Art. 4, Regulation 133412000.
23 Art. 3(3), Regulation 133412000.
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11. Annex 11, Part 1, specifies that the CGEA is possible for
all dual-use items listed in Annex I, except those specified in
Annex 11, Part 2, dealing with the more security-sensitive items.
National export authorities are not automatically obliged to
provide a CGEA, however, and, in any event, the exporter must
comply with the reporting requirements set out in Annex 11,
Part 3 .
For all other items, authorisation shall be granted, if so, by
the member state where the exporter is located.24 This authorisation
may be an individual, global or general authorisation. Member
states must maintain or introduce in national legislation the
possibility of granting a global authorisation to a specific exporter
for dual-use items valid for export to one or more specified
countries. The competent authorities may still refuse to grant an
export authorisation and may annul, suspend, modify or revoke
an export authorisation which they have already granted.25Finally,
exporters are required to keep detailed records of their exports.
Once more, with a view to GMES, the Regulation may turn
out to unduly and/or inadvertently obstruct the distribution of
GMES-generated products and services. Those products and
services may, certainly prima facie, be seen as dealing with
dual-use and/or sensitive software or information, and, wherever
this applies, the key players in GMES - notably the Commission
and the EU member states - may soon be looking for ways to
ensure exclusion of key GMES products and services from the
scope of the Regulation's regime.

24. See Art. 6, Regulation 133412000.
25. See Art. 9, Regulation 133412000.

THE 'S' OF 'SECURITY': EUROPE ON THE ROAD TO GMES

2.3. The United Nations system for international security
Finally, reference should be made briefly to the general global
system for dealing with international security issues, as developed
in the context of the United Nations. Under the UN Charter the
United Nations has been given the major task by the member
states to try and establish alternatively preserve international
peace and security, within the competencies allotted to it.26
Those competencies to a certain extent rest with the General
Assembly, which has the possibility to issue (non-binding)
Resolutions as well as to assert a role in despatching peace-keeping
or peace-making forces, but especially with the Security Council,
which has the power to issue binding Resolutions and initiate
mandatory processes in this regard.
Under this system the Security Council may, for example,
impose boycotts, economic blockades or even authorise hll-fledged
military actions if it considers international peace and security
sufficiently threatened.Z7 Throughout the last decades, these
powers have been used in such cases as the Yugoslav civil wars
(vis-a-vis Serbia in particular), the Iraqi invasion in Kuwait in
1990, and the military actions against Afghanistan in 2002 and
Iraq in 2003.
The main point to keep in mind for GMES is that, should
any such measures be imposed by the Security Council in the
future, the relevant GMES actors would be bound to comply
with them as well. It could be imagined in particular that certain
data products or services would not be allowed to be delivered
to certain parties, or that certain international cooperation

26. Charter of the United Nations (hereafter UN Charter), San Francisco, done
26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945; USTS 993; 59 Stat.
1031; UKTS 1946 No. 67; Cmd. 6666 & 6711; ATS 1945 No. 1.
2? Cf. Artt. 41, 42, UN charter.
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ventures with certain parties on GMES-related issues would
have to be suspended or cancelled in cases where the Security
Council would determine a threat to international peace and
security to exist.

2.4. Concluding remarks

The 'S' of GMES results in several issues of security and
dual-use character requiring discussion in this context. Data
generated by GMES, or information based on such data, could
very well be subjected to the legal regime, summary as it may
be, applicable to international transboundary movement of
security-sensitive information or become involved in international
actions trying to preserve international peace and security.
In particular once GMES starts generating its 'own' data
this might well entail substantial limitations to GMES operations.
In the last resort, however this should not qualify as much of
a real obstacle in the way of GMES. The Union and its member
states were actively engaged in matters relating to sensitive
dual-use technology transfers from the beginning, and have also
played an active role in protecting perceived security interests
elsewhere, such as in the United Nations. It is only the natural
course of things that GMES will not be allowed to somehow
put those interests at risk by moving beyond the parameters
resulting from the politico-legal environment described above.
GMES might well work as a tool and a catalyst for further
European involvement in such areas, and thus evolve into the
main pillar under such involvement, at least as far as outer space
is concerned - that is: if at least a proper, transparent, coherent
and efficient institutional framework for legal decision-making
will be established.
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3. Access to remote sensing data
3.1. The international regime for access to remote sensing
data
One of the most fundamental rules of space law is the
principle of freedom of space activitiesm2*
Consequently, using
satellites for remote sensing purposes is basically allowed. The
Outer Space Treaty itself only provides for a few rather general
principles to which any space activities should conform, such
as international cooperation, mandatory supervision and authorisation
of private space activities (for which a state is held responsible
without further qualification), and bona Jide efforts to minimise
harmful effects of one's space activities, for example as to the
environment .29
Most notably, Article I calls for the "exploration and use of
outer space" to be "for the benefits and in the interests of all
countries"; Article 111 requires such activities to be "in the
interest of maintaining international peace and security"; and
Article IV imposes certain limits upon the freedom to use outer
space for military purposes. Under the latter Article the stationing
of weapons of mass-destruction in outer space is prohibited,
whereas the Moon and other celestial bodies should only be
used "exclusively for peaceful purposes". In conjunction with
the former clause, the Test Ban Treaties furthermore prohibit
the testing of nuclear weapons in outer space.30
The specific issue of remote sensing, as a sub-set of space
activities, at the global level has only been dealt with in any
detail by UN General Assembly Resolution 41/65, adopted by
consensus on 3 December 1986.31Whilst the Resolution per se

28. See also Art. I, Outer Space Treaty.
29. See, resp., Artt. 111, VI, IX, Outer Space Treaty.
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does not constitute binding law, its adoption by consensus, as
well as the general respect accorded to its contents, leads most
experts toxonsider those contents to reflect customary international
law.32 Thus, the - relatively scarce - state practice in terms of
express national regulations and policies on access to remote
sensing data confirms that states generally recognise the validity
of the Principles as binding law as such, even if the interpretations
may sometimes differ considerably. One may for example refer
here to the main issue of discussion under the Resolution, which
is that of 'non-discriminatory access' to data33 - which might
at least prima facie impose obligations also upon GMES which
considerably limit certain elements of its envisaged activities
from a legal perspective.
The level of agreement on this 'non-discriminatory access' principle
and what it means in detail is not particularly i m p r e ~ s i v e . ~ ~
More importantly, certainly in the European context, it was not
at all considering the possible use of data for military or even
security purposes, whether in the context of the non-discriminatory
30. See Art. I(l.a), Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere,
in Outer Space and Under Water, Moscow, done 5 August 1963, entered
into force 10 October 1963; 480 UNTS 43; TIAS 5433; 14 UST 1313;
UKTS 1964 No. 3; ATS 1963 No. 26; Art. I(1), Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, New York, done 24 September 1996, not yet entered into force.
31. Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space
(hereafter Resolution 41/65), UNGA Res. 41/65, of 3 December 1986; UN
Doc. A/AC.105/572/Rev.l, at 43; 25 ILM 1334 (1986).
32. See e.g. C.Q. Christol, Space Law - P~ist,Present and Future (1991), 73;
K.R. Sridhara Murthi. Space Communications and Remote Sensing Applications
in Asia and the Pacific: Technology and Legal Perspectives, in 2004 Space
Law Conference (2004), 244; M . Williams, The UN Principles on Remote
Sensing Today, in Proceedings of the Forty-Eighth Colloquium on the LOW
of Outer Space (2006), 3-5.
33. Cf. Princ. XII, Resolution 41/65, which will be analysed in more detail
iri$a, in para. 3.2.
34. Cf. e.g. the author's Non-discriminatory data dissemination in practice, in
Earth Observation Data Policy and Europe ( E d . R. Harris)(ZOO2), 41-50.
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access principle or even outside of it.
ESA for example had undertaken several comprehensive
satellite remote programmes until the advent of GMES, inclusive
of satellite operations, data handling and data distribution, such
as the two European Remote Sensing Satellites ERS-1 and
ERS-2, and the more recent Envisat, and published quite extended
documents on the data policy to be applied.35
In none of those cases however, did such a data policy make
any specific reference to specific security-related reasons for
non-disclosure of data, albeit that such non-disclosure could, if
need be, come to be excused as not falling within the scope
of non-discrimination. Moreover, it should be reiterated that so
far ESA has not been mandated, or seen, to be involved in
straightforward security-related activities. Finally, at the time
of neither ERS nor Envisat data policy drafting, was the level
of resolution taken into consideration such that militarily-relevant
usage seemed around the corner - by default any unforeseen
military customers respectively usages for example would
probably have to be treated as commercial customers respectively
usages.
By way of comparison, however, also in the case of the
United States, where there would be no principled obstacles to
involvement of remote sensing in security-related areas, this
conclusion would apply. Neither in the United States Land
Remote Sensing Policy Act of 199236 nor in any subsequent
data policy documents was reference made to security let alone
35. E.g. for Envisat: the Envisat Data Policy, ESAIPB-E0(97)57 rev. 3, Paris,
19 February 1998, drafted by the Earth Observation Programme Board of
ESA. See further G . Kohlhammer, The Envisat Exploitation Policy, in ESA
Bzrlletin 106 (June 2001), 128-33.
36. Land Remote Sensing Policy Act, Public Law 102-555, 102nd Congress,
H.R. 6133, 28 October 1992; 15 U.S.C. 5601; 106 Stat. 4163.
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military usage of data in direct reference to the principle of
non-discriminatory access - whilst such reference was made at
a considerable number of other places in those documents.
Thus, the examples of two rather distinct key players in the
world-wide application of, for example, the Wassenaar Arrangement,
already show a certain acknowledgment of the authority of
Resolution 41/65 in this field, but without any connection at
all to security-related remote sensing activities. This then can
only be interpreted - with reference also to Article I of the
Outer Space Treaty and the fundamental principle of freedom
of space exploration and use pronounced by it - as meaning
that such security-related usage of remote sensing data does
not fall within the scope of the 'non-discriminatory access' principle.
In other words: one does not need to be bothered by this
principle when deciding to (not) disseminate certain data from
remote sensing satellites which are clearly in the military and
security domain - something reinforced of course by the
confinement, in the last resort, of the Resolution to remote sensing
"for the purpose of improving natural resources management,
land use and the protection of the en~ironment".~~

3.2. The substance of Resolution 41/65
Analysis of the substance of Resolution 41/65 further confirms
the above conclusion. For a start, it acknowledges the freedom of
remote sensing activities, as one particular manifestation of the
freedom of space activities subject only to international law.38
Further to this, the Resolution provides some important parameters
for remote sensing activities.
37. Princ. I(a), Resolution 4 1/65.
38. See Princ. 111, Resolution 41/65.

THE 'S' OF 'SECURITY': EUROPE ON THE ROAD TO GMES

Firstly, it should be reiterated that the Resolution applies
to remote sensing activities "for the purpose of improving
natural resources management, land use and the protection of
the e n ~ i r o n m e n t " .Since
~ ~ such usage arguably would not require
the quality of spatial resolution of better than in the range of
10 metres, any very high resolution (VHR) data issues might
fall outside the scope of the Resolution. Following from this,
somewhat narrow, definition of remote sensing for the purposes
of the Resolution, it excludes many activities relevant from a
security perspective from its scope.
Then, Principle I1 provides that "Remote sensing activities
shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries, irrespective of their degree of economic, social or
scientific and technological development, and taking into particular
consideration the needs of the developing countries". Actually,
this Principle very much supports the general establishment of
GMES, although it also raises some questions as to the extent
in which such benefits are to be created in a mandatory fashion.
Here, the frequently-found and rather general reference to
"the benefit and (...) interest of all countries" with special
consideration for the developing countries was developed further
by means of another UN Resolution in 1996." This Resolution
left complete freedom to states "to determine all aspects" of
such cooperation, and furthermore repeatedly referred to the
requirement of "an equitable and mutually acceptable basis" for
any activities undertaken in its implementati~n.~~
39. Princ. ](a), Resolution 41/65.
40. Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of all States, Taking into
Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries (Resolution 5 1/122),
UNGA Res. 511122, of 13 December 1996; XXII-I Annals of Air and
Space Law (1997), at 556; 46 ZLW (1997). at 236.
41. See Princc. 2, 3, Resolution 511122.
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Principle IV of Resolution 41/65 then deals with the core
issue of satellite remote sensing: the dilemma between the
freedom of use of outer space, in its particular manifestation
of freedom of information-gathering making use of satellites,
and the principle of sovereignty of states over their own territory,
more in particular over their own wealth and natural resources.
These two concepts collide where the 'sensed state' finds itself
in a situation that a 'sensing state' might obtain valuable
information, especially in economic terms, with regard to the
territory of the 'sensed state' which that state itself does not possess.

A balance of sorts has been established by the Resolution,
which in the final analysis tilts towards the freedom of remote
sensing activities. The principle of full and permanent sovereignty,
it is true, is to be respected, consequently legitimate rights and
interests of the 'sensed state' shall not be harmed, and also the
benefit and interest of all countries shall be taken into account
(that is, including those of the 'sensed state').42 All this, however,
does not alter the fact that the 'sensed state' neither has a veto
to prevent it from being 'sensed', nor an exclusive, free or
preferential right of access to the data, nor is it entitled
automatically to becoming a partner in the relevant remote
sensing operation^.^^ This becomes especially clear when these
principles are seen in conjunction with Principle XII, since for
the purpose of a particular set of remote sensing data concerning
its territory the 'sensed state' is no different from any other
state interested in such data.
Principle XI1 namely provides: "As soon as the primary data
and the processed data concerning the territory under its
jurisdiction are produced, the sensed State shall have access to
them on a non-discriminatory basis and on reasonable cost
M See Princ. IV, Resolution 41/65.
43. Cf. Princ. XIII, Resolution 41/65.
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terms. The sensed State shall also have access to the available
analysed information concerning the territory under its jurisdiction
in the possession of any State participating in remote sensing
activities on the same basis and terms, particular regard being
given to the needs and interests of the developing countries."44

In terms of further legal parameters to the freedom to
distribute remote sensing data or not, finally two further Principles
contained in Resolution 41/65 are of special importance with
a view to GMES, even though such importance is more directly
related to the 'E' of 'environment' than to the 'S' of 'security'.
Firstly, Principle X provides: "Remote sensing shall promote
the protection of the Earth's natural environment. To this end,
States participating in remote sensing activities that have identified
information in their possession that can be used to avert any
phenomenon harmful to the Earth's natural environment shall
disclose such information to States concerned."
Secondly, in rather similar fashion Principle XI provides:
"Remote sensing shall promote the protection of mankind from
natural disasters. To this end, States participating in remote
sensing activities that have identified processed data and analysed
information in their possession that may be useful to States
affected by natural disasters, or likely to be affected by impending
natural disasters, shall transmit such data and information to
States concerned as promptly as possible."
Principle XI thus largely mirrors Principle X; the latter
dealing with man-originating threats to the natural environment
of the Earth, the former with nature's threats against mankind.
The main noticeable difference with Principle X is that Principle
XI explicitly applies to "processed data" in addition to "analyzed
44. ~ ~ n ~ h a sadded.
'is
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information", as opposed to mere "information".
Neither of them, finally, alter the conclusion that military
and other traditional security issues were not addressed at all
by the Resolution, which therefore cannot provide any specific
guidance regarding how GMES data of such a nature are to
distributed, read handled. This leaves GMES authorities, at least
as far as the Resolution is concerned, with the principal freedom
to decide on any distribution policy of data for military and
defence purposes as they see fit; no obligation of non-discriminatory
access, whatever its precise scope and reach, can interfere therewith.

3.3. The Charter on Space and Major Disasters
Of major impact in some of the areas where GMES is
going to become active, the Charter on Space and Major
Disasters focuses directly and exclusively on the tnitigation of
major disasters and their harmful eff'ects without creating any
new international o r g a n i s a t i ~ n . ~ ~
The Charter was established by a number of leading space
agencies with operational remote sensing capabilities, initiated
by ESA, one of the two 'founding fathers' of GMES, and the
French space agency CNES in 1999 as a follow-up to the
Unispace IIT Conference, where the potential of earth observation
in the context of major disasters was prominently
It also represents a specific manifestatic~n of such general
principles of space law as pertaining to the benefit of all
countries and the requirement to allow free and uninhibited

45. See http::iwww.disasterschartzr.org:inain,~.e.html. 'The full name is "C'harrer
On Cooper:ition To Achieve The Coordinated Use Of Space Facilities In
'The Event Of Katural Or Technological Disasters".
46. See e.g. Report oi'the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration
and Peaceful Uses of Outcr Space, A;CONF. 18416 (1999). 33-7, 64.
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access to data if natural or man-made disasters are at hand, as
discussed above in the context of Resolution 4 1/65.47
In due course, the Canadian Space Agency (CSA), the US
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the
Indian Space Agency ISRO, the Argentine National Commission
on Space Activities CONAE and most recently the Japanese
Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), the United States
Geological Survey (USGS) and the Disaster Monitoring
Constellation (DMC) joined, so that the Charter currently counts
nine full-fledged partners.48
The Charter, declared formally operational on 1 November
2000, aims at providing a unified system of space data acquisition
and delivery to those affected by natural or man-made disasters
-and thus is clearly operative in the same areas GMES
envisages to address. Each member agency has committed
resources to support the provisions of the Charter and thus
helps to mitigate the effects of disasters on human life and
property: ESA provides data from ERS and Envisat, CNES from
the SPOT satellites, CSA from the Radarsat satellites, ISRO
from the IRS satellites, NOAA from the POES and GOES
satellites and CONAE from the SAC-C satellite.
Article 6(1) of the Charter provides that requests to adhere
to it may be made by any space system operator or space agency
with access to space facilities agreeing to contribute to the
commitments made by the parties. In other words, it is a de
facto prerequisite for membership to possess the capability to
operate satellite systems. Such capability is not necessarily limited
to earth observation satellites or instruments; "space systems for
observation, meteorology, positioning, telecommunications and
47. See Art. I, Outer Space Treaty; Princc. X, XI, Resolution 41/65.
118. See http://www.disasterscharter.org/participants~e.html.
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TV broadcasting or elements thereof such as on-board instruments,
terminals, beacons, receivers, VSAT's and archives" are also
ac~eptable.~~
Upon request by a "beneficiary body", the member agencies
acquire the data of the area affected by the disaster from their
satellites, process the data into images, analyse them further if
necessary, and distribute the resulting information free of charge
to those states affected by the disaster via "associated bodiesws0.
It is explicitly provided that a state affected by disaster which
requests access to certain data needs to contact relevant associated
bodies - or "cooperating bodiesW5lacting in partnership with
an associated body.
The effective determination of which satellites are to provide
data for a particular disaster is facilitated by prior scenario-writing,
anticipating which data and information would be useful for
which types of crisis. The parties shall together analyse recent
crises for which space facilities could have provided or did
provide effective assistance to the authorities and rescue services
concerned, draw conclusions and prepare sample response plans
for such future events.52 A scenario covers such issues as the
type of sensors effective for specific disasters and selection
49. Art. 1, Charter on Space and Major Disasters.
5U. Art. 5(2), Charter on Space and Major Disasters; an "associated body" is
"an institution or service responsible for rescue and civil protection, defence
and security under the authority of a State whose jurisdiction covers an
agency or operator that is a party to the Charter".
51. Cooperating bodies include the European Union, the other 'founding father'
of GMES, the UN Bureau for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
and other recognized national or international organizations with which the
parties may have cause to cooperate in pursuance of the Charter. A
"cooperating body" does not operate a space system but acts in partnership
with an associated body which does; see Art. 3(5), Charter on Space and
Major Disasters.
52. See Art. 4(2), Charter on Space and Major Disasters.
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criteria for use of a specific satellite.
The Charter has so far helped and will continue to be of
help in a large number of rather varying events; not only in
developing but certainly also in developed countries. With a
view to GMES then, the main consequence following from the
development of the Charter concerns the respective roles of
ESA and the European Union, which make it rather likely for
GMES to become closely involved in Charter activities, or even
actually take over the implementation of European contributions
to Charter operations in the future. As the Charter, however,
operates on a 'best efforts' basis and legally speaking does not
constitute a comprehensive closed and binding system, it would
be rather unlikely for it to result in obligations for GMES to
disseminate data in case that would result in a threat to the
security of the European states involved. Rather, GMES would
more often than not be helpful for those states to further the
cause of the Charter in bundling efficiently relevant space activities.

3.4. General humanitarian obligations
Both the international space law-rules pertinent for remote
sensing and the Charter on Space and Major Disasters effectively
are representations of a broader, general international law-duty
for states to assist other states and their peoples in cases of
larger humanitarian disasters, whether natural or man-made. As
to the latter, understandably from a realistic politico-legal
perspective but of course very unfortunately, these exclude those
man-made disasters created by wars, persecution and other forms
of violence, since in particular those states where events in
these categories take place are generally unwilling to have other
states come to the rescue. merely on humanitarian grounds.
Since precisely those last categories of man-made disasters
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are at the heart of the 'S' of 'security', reference must still be
made (even if briefly) to the existence of these underlying
general humanitarian principles which do, in principle, apply
to security issues as well. Though they would apply also in
cases not covered by either the international space law-regime
or the Charter (whether ratione materine or ratione personae),
and as such would have a general bearing on a number of
GMES activities, their main disadvantage from a more practical
perspective is their very broad and vague content. At every
turn a different set of issues and situations are at stake, making
it very difficult to determine what, in any particular case, such
general humanitarian duties would amount to in terms of, for
example, concrete actions or measures.
Thus, to give one particularly interesting and illustrative
example, the obligations to provide data to a sensed state could
well come into conflict with the obligation to act for humanitarian
considerations. This would arise in a case where refugees were
fleeing persecution by a ruling regime in a given state, and the
location of such refugees would be of equal interest to the aid
agencies and to the ruling authorities - in the latter case for
all the wrong reasons.
For that reason, these obligations should be best perceived
as obligations-of-effort, as opposed to obligations-of-result. Their
practical reach remains to be determined for each specific
instance, and in the last resort they may serve more as guidelines
to prefer one course of action over another if, all other things
essentially equal, the first course would be more in tune with
such humanitarian obligations.

3.5. Concluding remarks

For purposes of realising GMES, especially the general
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international law-regime on access to remote sensing data and
the more specific requirements under the Charter resting upon
key GMES players such as ESA should be taken into account.
In the second phase of GMES this would also apply to any
satellite data directly generated from 'GMES satellites'. These
regimes would considerably limit the discretion of any key
GMES entity in deciding whether and how to distribute certain
data under GMES.
Whoever would be in the driver's seat for GMES satellite
activities should be aware of these regimes, and monitor their
further development as to substantial effects on his own discretion
with respect to GMES data distribution. This reverts back to
the roles of, firstly, any 'GMES Authority' to be developed,
and secondly, the Commission andlor the EU member states.
Once more, however, upon closer look the existing regimes do
not in any essential measure provide obstacles for GMES - on
the contrary, it would be surprising if the rather loosely-formulated
restrictions to the freedom to (not) disseminate certain data
would suddenly be applied very rigorously to a system which
is generally designed to work in the favour of mankind's need
for environmental and other security. The proof of the pudding
is in the eating, however; and for the pudding to be digestible,
a proper, transparent, coherent and efficient institutional framework
for decision-making on GMES and GMES-related security and
military issues is requisite.

4. Towards properly integrating the 'S' into GMES
In the final analysis, it seems that GMES will not meet with
many undue legal obstacles coming from the two areas of
security issues respectively data access. The inherent limitations
coming from the former area are already well-known to the
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member states of the Union and ESA behind GMES, and
moreover leave some room for improvement when it comes to
developing a proper balance between security interests in the
traditional sense - which generally call for restriction of access
to, and usage of, data - and security interests in the more
modem sense, which generally would call for as widespread
availability and usage of data. The nascent legal regime developing
in the latter area on the other hand seem to be hardly relevant
so far, in legal terms, for the issues surrounding the involvement
of GMES in any type of security issues.
Thus, the issues are more of a fundamentally political nature,
referring to the acceptability of growing involvement of both
the Union and ESA in areas close to, even overlapping traditional
areas of defence and military security; a development already
gaining steam under the existing legallinstitutional European
construct, but soon requiring a more solid and appropriately
renewed legal/institutional basis.
Rather then being fundamentally hindered by the existing
rules of the road or in danger of operating against main relevant
premises and principles - of which this article focused on the
two areas coming closest at the moment to an international
legal regime - GMES would likely even grow into a component
part of that legal/institutional regime, and thus help to shape
future legal developments in this field.
It might well do so, for example, by acting as a counterweight
to Wassenaar-type of restrictions on data access, as they might
be perceived by non-participating states from a negative
perspective, and come to represent the 'sharing side' of European
space efforts rather than the 'excluding side'. Similarly, GMES
may help to develop the loose and overtly-political regime on
data access into a more legalistically-phrased, clear-cut and
coherent legal regime, by its own practices as they will evolve,
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and equally may help to further boost the benefits of the Charter
on Space and Major Disasters to mankind.
To what extent GMES will actually be able to achieve such
contributions then crucially depends upon the governance
structure to be developed for GMES by the European member
states with a view to the global context in which GMES is
going to operate, including the Global Earth Observation System
of Systems (GEOSS). Whatever its precise outlines, whether
Joint Undertaking, Executive Agency, Community Agency, JTI
or even a newly established international entity; it should be
properly structured in terms of size and competencies, transparent
in its decision-making and balancing of military security
respectively environmental and civil security interests (wherever
the two may run counter to each other), coherent in making
certain the outcome binds - or at least guides - all European
stakeholders, and efficient in not reinventing wheels or redoubling
the efforts of organisations and bodies already involved in the
field. In other words: the 'S' should be integrated properly into
GMES.
In that sense finally, it is ~ e r t a i n l y a ~ p r o ~ r ito
a t eexpect that
GMES will be a further manifestation of the transformation of
the fundamental principle of Article I of the Outer Space Treaty
into practical realities: that space should be used "for the benefits
and in the interests of all countries", both developing and
developed, both spacefaring and non-spacefaring.

